Reducing Palestinians to the Poverty and Hopelessness of Canadian Indians

I was struck by the following lines from a recent World Bank Report on the Palestinian economy.

... However, much greater attention must be given to the removal of obstacles to allow real Palestinian private sector-led growth. The Oslo Accords of 1993 anticipated an arrangement that would last for a five-year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated. They did not anticipate the lack of forward movement on the political process that has been experienced with its concomitant economic effects. This so called status quo belies a process whereby the continuation of restrictions and the absence of real opportunities to open up the Palestinian economy are actually having a lasting negative impact on its overall competitiveness.While some of the costs imposed by the current situation are transitory and could be expected to disappear with a peace agreement, others are posed to remain and are likely to require significant time and financial resources to be remedied. 

The growth potential of a small economy depends to a large extent on its capacity to compete in global markets – yet, since 1994, the Palestinian economy has been steadily losing this capacity. In particular, the manufacturing sector, one of the key drivers of export-led growth, has largely stagnated between 1994 and the present and its share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has declined substantially. In the meantime, the agriculture sector has doubled its employment but sector productivity was roughly halved. 

The share of exports of goods in the Palestinian economy, at around 7 percent in 2011 (from around 10 percent in 1996), is among the lowest in the world. Moreover, Palestinian exports are highly concentrated in low value added goods and services and they are exported to only a small number of countries, with more than 85 percent of them heading to Israel. Even with the removal of exogenous restrictions, the Palestinian economy is ill-positioned to benefit quickly and sufficiently from export opportunities and adjustments would require significant resources and time. 

With low labor force participation and high rates and duration of unemployment, many Palestinians of working age do not have the opportunity to develop on-the-job skills. Furthermore, the concentration of the labor force in small enterprises for trade and services is not conducive to the development of skills that would render Palestinian workers competitive in the global economy. The growth in public sector employment has supported job creation but is not a sustainable solution in the medium and long term. The worrisome implication of these phenomena is that the long term employability prospects for the Palestinian labor force are being eroded. In addition to the economic implications, protracted unemployment, especially among youth, tends to weaken social cohesion. 

Poor performance of infrastructure sectors has also had a negative impact on the competitiveness of the Palestinian economy. The PA’s worsening fiscal space for infrastructure spending has severely constrained the accumulation and management of physical infrastructure despite contributions from development partners. Restrictions on movement and access have also led to the deterioration of the quality of infrastructure as evidenced in various sectors such as water, transport, and telecommunications, with its negative impact most significant in Gaza.

Of course, the main obstacle to Palestinian economic growth is the Israeli occupation and all it entails (see first paragraph above.) Nor should we assume that all this is just an unintended consequence of an Israeli security driven policy. It is more likely, in my opinion, that the Israeli government understands full well the economic and social results of its policies on Palestinian society: just as Canada and the U.S. used economic restrictions to break the will and strength  to resist of North American First Nations (aka Indians.) Will Israeli policies succeed in reducing Palestinians to the state of poverty and despair of so many North American aboriginal communities? The big difference of course is that the Palestinians form a much larger population relative to Israeli Jews. But you don't have to be a Marxist to believe that economics drives much of sociology and politics and that a people's will and ability to resists depends in large part on its economic base.

To read the full Word Bank report see here.

To read about the same phenomenon on the day to day micro scale see this article from 972.

Economics Makes Strange Bedfellows

According to the economic website The Marker, Israel is now an active trans-shipment route for trade between Iraq, Jordan and Turkey. The trade is worth hundreds of millions of dollars in fees to Israel, and billions to the other parties. The trade has grown dramatically, as the alternate 100% land based route between Turkey and Iraq - via Syria - has become less viable due to the Syrian civil war. (One can only speculate as to why a route through the Kurdish autonomous zone of northern Iraq is not being used.)

The picture above shows the route through Israel, from the port of Haifa to the Jordan River crossing into Jordan  The numbers represent average truck loads per month. The total projection for 2013 is 6400 truck loads of good travelling from Turkey to Jordan and Iraq, and presumably an equal number coming back.

The Marker story begins:

What are the trucks from Turkey, Jordanian drivers  

and goods from Iraq doing  in Israel?

Israel approved trade between Jordan & Iraq and Turkey by the passage of Jordanian and Turkish trucks through the port of Haifa. ■ Convoys are accompanied by police. Drivers  passports are not stamped.  ■ The government hopes to expand the arrangement. Expected revenue of 200 million per year.

see full story (in Hebrew) at: http://www.themarker.com/dynamo/1.2003603


(h/t to Lisa Goldman)

Well, At Least Its Good for The Jews

From Haaretz - April 21

Court Rules: Judaism ≠ Israel

A British court has just ruled against a Jewish pro Israel activist who claimed that his union's anti-Zionist positions were antisemitic. The court wrote, in part

 “a belief in the Zionist project or an attachment to Israel or any similar sentiment cannot amount to a protected characteristic. It is not intrinsically a part of Jewishness.”

This is a welcome blow to the anti-Zionism = antisemtism trope that is being increasingly heard in the U.S, Canada, and Britain.

see Haartez for more details.

Ethic Nationalism vs Civic Nationalism

Buy Hebrew Watermelons

poster: 1930

Ethic Nationalism is the nationalism that demands loyalty to and tries - or at least claims to try -  to serve the interests of a particular ethnic group: e.g. Serbs, Quebecois, Germans, or Jews, regardless of state boundaries and place of residence. Some states are explicitly ethno-nationalist e.g. Serbia and Israel. Some movements in some states wish to make their states ethno-nationalist; e.g. the Arrow Cross in 1930s and 40's Hungary, the Fidesz Party in today's Hungary, the various "Nativist" parties in 19th century America (e.g. The No Nothing Party, and the American Party - Millard Filmore ran on the American Party ticket in 1856), and, it can be argued, certain factions of the PQ in today's Quebec.

Civic Nationalism is the nationalism that demands loyalty to a state and tries - or at least claims to try - to serve the interests of all the citizens of that state. America is the prime example of such a nationalism and such a state: other examples include Canada, France, and Britain.

I recently participates in a conversation on an email list as to why, and how, and when Israel became an ethno-national state and Zionism a movement that advocated for such a nationalism and state. As part of the ongoing discussion I wrote

... [Person X] states correctly that modern European States grew out of ethno-nationalism. Yes they did. And that trend reached its apogee with the ethno-nationalism of the Nazi's. Since then, Western European states, at least, have moved away from ethno-nationalism and towards civic nationalism. Despite all the problems of integrating minorities into the fabric of Britain, France, Italy, Spain etc - they are allowed a path to full citizenship, and legally they are guaranteed full rights and equality once they do. There are currently three black cabinet ministers in the French government. How many Palestinian Arab cabinet ministers have there been in the history of the State of Israel? (Answer - 1; two if you include Druze.) ...

Another person responded:

The struggle between what you call ethno-nationalism and civic nationalism in Israel has been going on since the establishment of the state. I believe that the upsurge of ethno-nationalism and dearth of minorities in Israel's governments stem from the unconcluded business of the state of Israel and its neighbors. So long as many Israeli Arabs are conflicted between their Israeli citizenship and loyalty to their fellow Palestinians, Jewish Israelis, still the majority group in Israel, will regard their Arab citizens with suspicion and feel inhibited to accept the Arabs as equal citizens.

And I responded to that with this:

I respectfully disagree. The struggle between ethno-nationalism and civic nationalism in Israel (and Zionism) has been going on since much before the establishment of the state. Many - perhaps most - of the late 19th century European Zionist and Jewish colonists in Ertez Yisrael were already disdainful of the Arabs, and were not interested in integrating with them. At best they wished to ignore them; at worst to exploit them.

Ahad Haam - the leading Zionist intellectual of his day - noted this in his 1891 essay The Truth from Etez Yisrael: "From abroad we are accustom to believing that the Arabs are all desert savages or like donkeys ... This is a big mistake." Writing of the agents and colonists of Hovevi Zion who had been active in Palestine, by then for over 10 years, he writes: "We still do not have one reliable person who can at least read Arabic fluently."

Writing of the relationship of the Jewish colonists to the local Arabs he writes: "... in all things it is our custom to learn nothing from the past for the future. There is certainly one think we could have learned from our past and present: how careful we must be not to arouse the anger of other people against ourselves by reprehensible conduct. How much more careful must we be then in our conduct to a foreign people among whom we live once again, to walk together in love and respect, and needless to say in justice and righteousness. And what do our brethren in Ertez Yisrael do? Quite the opposite! They were slaves in their land of exile, and they suddenly find themselves with unlimited freedom, the kind of wild freedom that can only be found in a country like Turkey. This sudden change has engendered in them an impulse to despotism, as always happens when "the slave becomes king," and behold they walk with the Arabs in hostility and cruelty, unjustly encroaching on them, shamefully beating them for no good reason, and even bragging about what the do, and there is no one to stand in the breach and to call a halt to this dangerous and despicable behaviour. [plus ça change... ! sn ] ... [The Arab] even if he restrains himself ... the rage will remain in his heart, and he is unrivaled in bearing a grudge.


Writing later - in 1912 - about the Zionist strategy of "separate development" (e.g "Avodah Ivrit", "Kneh Ivri" see http://www.palestineposterproject.org/special-collection/historical-figures-and-themes/buy-hebrew-campaignhebrew-laborconquest-of-labor for some bitter-sweet historical posters) Ahad Ha'am wrote: "Apart from the political danger, I can't put up with the idea that our brethren are morally capable of behaving in such a way … the thought comes to mind: if it is so now, what will be or relationship to the others if in truth we will achieve someday power in Eretz Yisreal. If this be the Messiah, I do not wish to see his coming."

Yitzhak Epstein, writing in his 1907 essay The Hidden Question, also warned that land acquisition practices that removed the Arab "felachim" from their land would inevitable lead to hostility. He called for cooperative projects with the Arabs, where Jews would become partners with them in the land - bringing advanced farming techniques, labour and cash to the joint ventures. He called for admitting Arab children to Jewish schools. Sadly virtually none of this came to pass. Writing of the Zionist practice in his time he writes: "It is time to open our eyes to our methods! ... This means we must distance ourselves from the ugly ... from every deed tainted with plunder ... we must uproot every thought of conquest and expropriation. ... This is not a dream ... if instead of uprooting the Arabs of Metullah we would divide the land with them, then we would not spend even half of what we now spend on bribes to the wicked, expulsion of indigent families, court cases, and untenable compromises."

Some Zionist factions - notably those intellectuals around Judah Magnes and Martin Buber, as well as the left wing Hashomer Hatzair kept alive the idea of a bi-national Jewish Arab Commonwealth right up to 1948. But long before then, most had fallen into the etho-nationalist/chauvanists visions that Ahad Haam and Epstein had warned against. Jabotinsky's Iron Wall might have been the most extreme enunciation of "separate development", but for practical purposes most of the Zionist movement was behaving that way, at least from 1930 onward.

Indeed, as soon as Herzll declared the goal of the Zionist Movement to be a Jewish State - as opposed to a Jewish Homeland in Eretz Yisrael, the Zionist Movement was on an inevitable collision course with the native population. The Zionist Movement - after all was declaring in advance - who would be the lords of the new state and in whose interests it would function. Why would the indigenous Arabs agree to such a plan? Had Ahad Ha'am's or Epstein's or Magnes' or Buber's visions won the day, perhaps things would have turned out differently. But they didn't.

Simply put, the Arabs never figured seriously in any mainstream Zionist plan - except as obstacles. There was never a mainstream Zionist vision of multicultural, multi-ethnic, multi-national state. In short there was never a serious mainstream vision of civic nationalism that included the Arabs. It was ethno-centric all the way down.

I one sense, the mainstream Zionist Movement cannot be blamed for this. It was in synch with the times: taking lessons both from the embers of imperialism and the fresh fires of European ethno-nationalism. And its most ardent supporters, certainly the source of most aliyah, were mostly Eastern European Jews who had never experienced anything like ethnic integration. But that is all cold comfort. By taking that path, we are lead almost inevitably to today. Voices did call - and are still calling - for another way. But they were - and are - being ignored.

Can Israel Ever Have a Non Jewish President?

Can Israel Ever Have a Non Jewish President? I would hope so.

Of course, I don't see it happening any time soon. But is theory it should not be a problem.

Of course many Jews and many Israelis disagree. Recently, on an email list I participate in someone wrote: "The Jews will disappear, if Israel will not become a cultural centre for the Jews. Therefore, if Israel remains the cultural centre, there cannot be a non-Jewish PM or President in Israel."

Here is my reply:


I disagree. (And, by the way, so did Mordecai Kaplan.)

Why does Israel - THE STATE - have to be the cultural center? Why can't the Jewish community in the land of Israel be the cultural centre? And if so what does it matter what religion/nationality the Prime Minister or President is?

For hundreds of years Poland was the Jewish (or at least the Ashkenazi) cultural center, and by Poland everyone understands that this means the Jewish community of Poland, not the Kingdom of Poland - which for much of that time did not exist, as Poland was under foreign rule.

In earlier periods Spain was the Jewish cultural centre - when it was ruled by Muslims. Still earlier Babylon was the Jewish cultural centre when it was ruled by Persian Zoro-Astrians. The Mishna was composed in Ertez Yisrael when the Roman Emperor was the head of State, and the Tanach itself was mostly compiled - according to the common theories - either under Babylonian or Persian rule, and probably in Babylon.

I agree that it is best for the Jewish people to have a strong cultural centre, and today that cultural centre is in Israel, and will stay that way for the foreseeable future. But that does not mean that the STATE must be Jewish or that its leaders must be Jewish.

I also think that the Jewish community in Israel is doing a BAD job of being the kind of cultural centre I would like to see, and therefore I think that we need to make sure (a) that culture improves and/or those element of the Israeli Jewish culture I support are strengthened, and (b) we need to create a strong and vibrant Jewish "counter culture" in the Diaspora, both for its own/intrinsic value and in order to influence Israeli Jewish culture and world wide Jewish culture.

Finally - we are talking here about cultural - and by asserting that in order to preserve our culture we need to create an ethnically exclusive state that denies fundamental rights (like like having the right to be Prime Minister or President) to ethnic/national minorities - we are making a fundamental mistake in priorities. Political and economic rights must always trump cultural rights - if push comes to shove. The smart People figures out a way to avoid this conflict, to curb its desire fro cultural hegemony in order to create a more just political and economic - and ultimately cultural - space.

I lived in Israel for 15 years, and my three children were born there. When I left, I understood full well that I was going to have a reduced (in quantity at least) level of Jewish experience, and that I would no longer be fully participating in the greatest Jewish project of our times. But I also understood that this project was fundamentally mistreating non-Jews. I tried to imagine 25 years into the future, howI would justify living in an apartheid state (and yes, that is the exact term I used in my internal conversations even back then) and I decided that my "cultural rights" did not justify the oppression of non-Jews, and I would just have to try to "muddle through" my cultural/religious/national life without the "benefit" of a hegemonic state structure, but also without the burden of having to justify and participate in and constantly struggle against that hegemony.

The kind of the Jewish culture, and cultural centre, that I dream of would be improved, not destroyed, if Israel were to have a non Jewish President or PM.

(PS. I don't want it understood that my personal reasons for moving from Israel were all "political" or noble. This was only one of the factors.)

--
Sydney

A Punch In The Stomach.

Read this:  

http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/five-broken-cameras-and-a-punch-in-the-stomach/

Here's a teaser:

My beloved son, even after eight months, was referring to the Palestinian protesters in a tone that he would use to talk about wild animals. The dehumanization of the Palestinians was so deeply ingrained in his psyche that even after three-quarters of a year into my “mission,” he could not free himself of it. I said nothing. There was nothing to say. Was my “mission” useless? Was this family sacrifice for naught? ...

I found this very powerful. Reading this - for me - was a "punch in the stomach." It explains, in part, why I left Israel 25 years ago, after living there for 15 years, and having 3 children born there.